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Abstract 
At the end of the 6
th legislature, fears that enlargement would hamper the workings of the 
European Parliament have largely proved unfounded. Despite the influx of a large number 
of new members to Parliament, parties have remained cohesive, and legislative output has 
remained steady. Moreover, after an initial phase of adaptation, MEPs from new member 
states have been increasingly socialised into the EP structure. Challenges have arisen in a 
rather different field, however. In order to remain efficient in the face of increasing 
complexity, the EP has had to streamline its working procedures, moving more decisions to 
parliamentary committees and cutting down time for debate. This paper argues that 
measures to increase the efficiency of the EP, most notably the trend towards speeding up 
agreements with the Council (1
st reading agreements) run the risk of undermining the EP’s 
role as a forum of debate. Should bureaucratisation increasingly trump politicisation, the 
legitimacy of the EP will be undermined, and voters will become ever more alienated from 
its work. For the 7th legislature of the European Parliament therefore, it is crucial to 
balance efficiency of output with a more politicised policy style that is able to capture 
public interest.  
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THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT – 
MORE POWERFUL, LESS LEGITIMATE? 
AN OUTLOOK FOR THE 7TH TERM 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 314/MAY 2009 
JULIA DE CLERCK-SACHSSE AND PIOTR MACIEJ KACZYŃSKI
* 
Introduction 
With the European Parliament (EP) elections just around the corner, this CEPS Working 
Document analyses the performance and institutional developments of the outgoing Parliament 
with a view to the implications this will have for the 7
th EU legislature.
1 Two issues are of major 
concern in this context: how the European Parliament is coping with the ‘big bang’ enlargement 
of 2004 and with the smaller one in 2007, and how the reforms envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty 
will affect its performance and legitimacy.  
Since 2004 the European Union has enlarged to include twelve new countries; raising concerns 
about the continued decision-making capacity of the EU institutions. However, in line with 
findings on the other two EU institutions, the Council of Ministers (the Council) and the 
European Commission (the Commission), these concerns have proved to be largely unfounded.
2 
Preliminary assessments of how the EP adapted to the enlargement of the Union have been, for 
the most part, positive. Indeed the EP has remained remarkably efficient, as both its legislative 
and non-legislative output have remained steady. Moreover, fears that the influx of a large 
group of new members from different domestic political cultures would upset the internal 
balance of the parliament have not materialised. Political groups seem to have remained largely 
cohesive. 
Challenges to the last legislature have arisen in rather different and unexpected ways, however. 
The enlargement, but mostly the growing legislative powers of the EP in successive treaty 
reforms, has made the work of the Parliament ever more intricate. Upholding the efficiency of 
the EP in the face of increasing complexity and size has come at a price. In order to ensure 
continued ‘output’, more and more decisions are now taken at the level of EP committees rather 
than being debated in plenary. Decisions are increasingly taken after only one reading in the 
Parliament, leaving little time for debate and scrutiny. As the EP evolves as an ever more 
assertive political actor, this is a somewhat paradoxical development. On the one hand, as the 
                                                      
* Julia De Clerck-Sachsse and Piotr Maciej Kaczyński are Research Fellows at the Centre for European 
Policy Studies in Brussels. 
1 The authors would like to thank Sebastian Kurpas for his input in outlining this research project, while 
still in his capacity as head of the Politics and Institutions section at CEPS. They would also like to thank 
Mike Beke, Jan Ulrich and Jirka Stepan for invaluable research assistance. This study is based on 
quantitative and qualitative data gathered during 34 interviews with MEPs, EP officials as well as 
officials from other EU institutions and outside observers. For more information on the methodology, see 
Annex 2.  
2 See, inter alia Old Rules, New Game: Decision-making in the Council of Ministers after the 2004 
Enlargement, Sara Hagemann and Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, CEPS Special Report, 2007 and The 
European Commission after Enlargement: Does more add up to less?, Sebastian Kurpas, Caroline Grøn 
and Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, CEPS Special Report, 2008. 2 | DE CLERCK-SACHSSE & KACZYŃSKI 
 
EP acquires more powers it starts to take on the characteristics of ‘normal’ national parliament 
as regards party cohesion and coalition formation. On the other hand, the pressures of efficiency 
have also led to a bureaucratisation of procedures (reduced speaking time in plenary and shifting 
more of the workload to the parliamentary committees, for example). All this undermines 
politicisation. 
The increasing bureaucratisation of the EP seen under the last legislature might seem necessary 
to allow the EP to operate efficiently and react swiftly to important policy events. But this paper 
argues that these developments could undermine the EP’s role as a public forum and a centre for 
debate. Especially in times of scepticism about further EU integration and growing voter apathy 
about the European elections, this development could be detrimental to the Parliament and to 
European integration in the long run.  
1.  The European Parliament and the 2004 and 2007 enlargements 
1.1 Institutional  adaptation 
Recent studies on voting behaviour in the EP argue that initial fears about the influx of a large 
number of new members upsetting the internal functioning of the EP did not materialise.
3 One 
of the concerns was that enlargement would lead to a re-nationalisation of voting because these 
countries would vote en bloc. Yet, the EP party system appears to have remained surprisingly 
steady, even after enlargement, as party cohesion and coalition formation along ideological 
rather than national lines are increasingly common, despite the increasing diversity of the 
political positions represented within the chamber.
4 Moreover, while cohesion rates vary 
according to different policy fields, the cohesion in committees where MEPs from new member 
states were proportionally overrepresented (Budget, Constitutional Affairs, Culture and 
Education, Foreign Affairs, Juridical Affairs, and Regional Development) were no lower than 
average. 
This is surprising for two reasons. First, with enlargement the diversity of the political landscape 
increased considerably. This is true not only in purely numerical terms but also with regard to 
political cultures and norms, given that many of the new member states share a common 
communist legacy. Moreover, the majority of new member states are newly independent 
countries;
5 all of which were among the Union’s poorest nations at the moment of accession. 
Second, the integration of the new national delegations is startling because political groups in 
the EP are generally seen as weaker than national ones. For example the European groups do 
not control electoral lists or therefore the re-election of their members.
6 Nevertheless they have 
been increasingly successful in socialising MEPs into their structures. 
Yet, analyses about voting behaviour underlie a certain caveat. Given that the party structures in 
these countries are still seen as being very much in flux, voting behaviour may still undergo 
considerable change.
7 Moreover, cohesion scores in most recent research is based on roll call 
votes (RCV). RCV, however, need to be specifically requested, and only account only for about 
one third of votes in the EP. Moreover, it has been argued that RCV are usually not called on 
                                                      
3 Hix et al. (2007); Kreppel and Gungor (2006); Schmitt and Thomassen (2005) 
4 Schmitt and Thomassen (2005); Hix and Noury (2009) 
5 From 10 Central Eastern countries only Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania have had a continuous 
state structure since 1989. Malta and Cyprus are also former colonies of the United Kingdom and 
regained their independence in the 1960s. 
6 Kreppel and Gungor, (2006); Corbett et al. (2007) 
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the most important policy issues, which can be assumed to be the most divisive.
8 What is more, 
RCV are often used strategically to enhance party cohesion among members (as they are often 
called by a group in order to monitor the voting of its members), or to signal the party’s position 
towards another group. In both events this would suggest that by nature RCV are biased towards 
greater cohesion.  
Table 1. European party groups’ cohesion rates – European Parliament 2004-09  
Policy Area 
EPP-
ED  PES  ALDE  UEN 
Greens/ 
EFA 
GUE-
NGL 
IND/ 
DEM  NI 
Overall cohesion rates  0.85  0.88  0.86  0.72  0.9  0.82  0.41  0.4 
Agriculture  0.77 0.78 0.81  0.76 0.86  0.7  0.31 0.5 
Budget  0.86 0.92 0.89  0.73 0.93  0.8  0.49 0.4 
Budgetary  control  0.83 0.93 0.93  0.8  0.95  0.82 0.43 0.2 
Civil liberties, justice &  
home  affairs  0.82 0.93 0.87  0.71 0.91  0.84 0.42 0.5 
Constitutional and  
inter-institutional  affairs  0.84 0.84 0.87  0.6  0.85  0.73 0.53 0.4 
Culture and Education  0.84  0.92  0.91  0.71  0.9  0.7  0.5  0.4 
Development 0.83  0.99  0.96  0.82  0.95  0.93  0.4  0.5 
Economics  0.88 0.85 0.89  0.69 0.88  0.76 0.49 0.4 
Employment & social affairs  0.82  0.9  0.82  0.71  0.89  0.89  0.41  0.3 
Environment & public health  0.85  0.88  0.84  0.72  0.93  0.91  0.34  0.4 
Fisheries  0.88 0.86 0.77  0.74 0.86  0.69 0.38 0.5 
Foreign  Affairs  0.86 0.89 0.86  0.7  0.89  0.8  0.46 0.4 
Gender  equality  0.79 0.97 0.85  0.67 0.92  0.91 0.38 0.4 
Industry, research & energy  0.87  0.88  0.83  0.75  0.9  0.71  0.35  0.4 
Internal market &  
consumer protection  0.87 0.85 0.75  0.68 0.94  0.93 0.36 0.3 
Internal regulations of the EP  0.66  0.7  0.63  0.47  0.68  0.37  0.31  0.4 
International  trade  0.95 0.9  0.94  0.86 0.89  0.92 0.33 0.4 
Juridical  affairs  0.91 0.9  0.89  0.81 0.94  0.85 0.33 0.4 
Petitions  0.84 0.92 0.86  0.77 0.93  0.9  0.53 0.5 
Regional  Development  0.87 0.9  0.91  0.72 0.9  0.82 0.43 0.4 
Transport  &  tourism  0.85 0.85 0.88  0.77 0.89  0.87 0.38 0.4 
Source: http://www.votewatch.eu/cx_european_party_groups.php Cohesion measures the extent to which the 
members of a European party group vote as a block or not. The scale is between 0 and 1; the closer the 
score to 1, the more cohesive a European group is.  
This does not mean, however, that the MEPs from new member states have had no impact on 
the EP at all. In certain policy fields they have added a different emphasis, most notably perhaps 
in their more sceptical attitude towards Russian foreign policy, and generally they adopt a more 
economically liberal stance in the field of market regulation and social policy, irrespective of 
party allegiance. As a result, on certain issues, cohesion may have suffered, or in any case has 
been much harder to achieve.
9 A prominent example is the controversial Services Directive, 
where a clear divide between old and new member states could be seen. Overall, it seems that 
                                                      
8 Carruba et al. (2004) 
9 These arguments were raised by many of the MEPs and civil servants in interviews conducted by the 
authors (Brussels, March – May 2009). 4 | DE CLERCK-SACHSSE & KACZYŃSKI 
 
the EP was able to accommodate the increasing diversity of positions with longer discussions 
and the setting up of new structures such as working groups to discuss controversial policy 
questions. Many of the interviews conducted for this paper also showed that members 
increasingly resorted to informal meetings to address contested issues before they came up for 
vote. This, however, raises questions about the quality of the resulting legislation. The need for 
compromise, including an ever-greater variety of positions, has led to longer and more technical 
legislation.
10 This trend seems to contravene the need to make EU policies more accessible, as 
well as making it harder to politicise them. 
Another change that could be observed during the last term is that as a result of the influx of 
new members, the balance of groups represented in the EP has shifted towards more the 
conservative parties. Both the EPP-ED and UEN gained as a result of the enlargement. This 
development is reinforced by the voting behaviour of the ALDE group, which voted more often 
with the EPP-ED group than with the socialists in the last term, as opposed to having gone 
along with the socialist PES more often previously.
11 However, the argument that the EP is 
becoming more like a national parliament that votes along a left-right spectrum, rather than 
operating along consensual lines needs to be viewed with some caution. On many questions, 
especially where the EP sees its position as relatively weak vis-à-vis the Council and where 
institutional matters are concerned, the two or even three big parties still vote together. The 
trend towards an emerging left-right spectrum on some policy questions is therefore counter-
balanced by the continuing tendency of the EP to present itself as a unitary actor vis-à-vis the 
other EU institutions and in other fields. If the largest three parties lose votes in the next 
elections, as is currently predicted, this could reinforce the impetus towards a grand coalition 
between the most powerful parties and further undercut politicisation. 
1.2  Integrating the new members 
Generally speaking, integrating the new members has been much less of a challenge than 
originally feared. In the first term of the 6
th legislature new members were rather 
underrepresented in the key offices such as the Bureau (14%), the Conference of Presidents 
(9%), and the Conference of Committee Chairmen (17%). Since 2007 new member states’ 
MEPs constitute 27% of the Parliament (or, 215 out of 785 MEPs). They had to learn the 
political game of the institution without much guidance from their political families. This is 
probably why they were not placed at the centre of the Parliament’s decision-making powers, 
but remained largely underrepresented during the first term of the 6
th legislature. Most 
strikingly, throughout the term they were seriously underrepresented among the committee 
coordinators among the largest three political groups. Among the EPP-ED and PES committee 
coordinators, only one MEP from each group comes from a new member state (Ms. Edit Bauer 
coordinates the EPP-ED in the Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee and Ms. 
Alexandra Dobolyi coordinates the PES in the Petitions Committee). In the ALDE group not a 
single coordinator came from a new member state. In contrast, there were three 
MEPs/coordinators in the EPP-ED and PES group, each elected for the first time in 2004 from 
older members, and nine in ALDE.  
Moreover, the new member states’ MEPs did not sit in the committees, which have major 
legislative output (measured as amount of co-decision files, see Figure 1 below). From the 
parliamentary committees that deal with the co-decision files they have been well-represented 
only in the horizontal Legal Affairs (JURI). In the most relevant policy committees, the 
                                                      
10 Maurer (2008) 
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Environmental (ENVI) and Transport (TRAN) Committee they were already underrepresented. 
As already demonstrated, the newer member states’ MEPs were mostly concentrated in non-
legislative committees, such as Regional Policy (REGI), Budget (BUDG), Foreign Affairs 
(AFET), Culture and Education (CULT) and Constitutional Affairs (AFCO).  
Figure 1. Map of the EP’s Committees by Co-Decision (COD) files and newer MS’ MEP 
membership 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from the European Parliament’s website. 
In the course of the first term, members underwent a considerable learning process, integrating 
themselves more and more into the political structures of the EP and increasingly gaining key 
offices. In the second term, for example, two of the leading committees went to chairs from new 
member states (Mr. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski in the Foreign Affairs Committee and Mr. Miroslav 
Ouzký in the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety). A similar development can also be 
seen in the case of rapporteurships. At first the parliamentarians from newer member states were 
not granted many co-decision files as rapporteurs. Yet since the mid-term (2007) the amount of 
reports prepared by those MEPs has been stable and corresponds to the share of their 
participation level in the chamber (27%; see Figure 2 below). 
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Figure 2. Ratio of co-decision reports written by category of MEPs 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the European Parliament’s website. 
2. An  increasingly  assertive legislature 
2.1  The EP’s use of its increasing powers during the 6th legislature 
Rather than institutional paralysis, an increasingly assertive legislature could be noted during 
the 6
th term. The EP is the most dynamic and evolving of European institutions; change is 
therefore built in to its functioning. This does not only apply to the EP’s adaptation to 
enlargement, but also to institutional developments, both internally and as part of the EPs place 
in the triangle of EU institutions between the Council and the Commission. Indeed the 
Parliament’s powers have been increased greatly over past decades. In particular, the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1993) which established the co-decision procedure placing the Council and the 
Parliament on a par as co-legislators set in motion an expansion of the EP’s legislative 
capacities, a change to which the EP is still adapting today.
12  
There are two main ways to expand Parliament’s powers in the decision-making system of the 
European Union. Firstly, there are treaty changes. Since the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 
all  European treaties have granted new powers or extended those already possessed by the 
Parliament. Most decisive perhaps were the changes of the Maastricht Treaty; since then each of 
the amending treaties has expanded the application of co-decision to new areas. The Lisbon 
Treaty would constitute yet another breakthrough as it expands the application of co-decision to 
numerous new areas and re-names it the “ordinary legislative procedure”. 
 
                                                      
12 For more on the history of Parliament’s power extension, see Priestley (2008). 
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The European Parliament’s legislative powers 
According to the current treaties there are four legislative procedures in the Union. One of 
them (coordination) is only very rarely used (there was only one initiative using the 
cooperation procedure since 1999), therefore the focus is on three remaining procedures:  
(1) Consultation Procedure; 
(2) Assent Procedure; 
(3) Co-Decision Procedure. 
Beyond these there are also certain policy fields in which the treaties do not foresee any role 
for the European Parliament. This applies for example to trade policy (article 133 TEC) or in 
some cases when the freedom of establishment is concerned (exclusion of certain activities, 
article 45 TEC), some elements of the movement of capital (articles 57(2) and 60 TEC), some 
elements of approximation of laws (article 96 TEC), and others.
13  
The role of the European Parliament varies in each of the procedures outlined above. In the 
co-decision procedure,
14 the Council and the Parliament co-decide as equal partners (the 
Parliament in two readings) and each institution has a veto power (in the Conciliation 
Committee, which for the EP is the equivalent of a third reading). The full procedure is used 
rarely; an example is the Working Time Directive, which failed in the Conciliation 
Committee in April 2009.
15 In the assent procedure, the Parliament cannot propose 
amendments, but still can reject proposals. In the cooperation procedure the Parliament’s 
opposition can be overridden by the Council’s unanimous decision (though it can propose 
amendments and there are two readings). In the consultation procedure the role of the 
Parliament is marginal as its position can be completely disregarded by the Council of 
Ministers. 
A second way of extending Parliament’s powers is through amending the existing secondary 
legislation, by changing the procedural rules. For example the 2006 comitology reform has 
strengthened the Parliament’s position in the implementation of the Community laws. 
‘Comitology’ is a process of adopting measures to implement legislative acts. In this process 
measures are adopted by the Commission, assisted by a committee of experts from the member 
states.
16 The 2006 reform provided the Parliament with scrutiny powers for the first time in 
cases where a committee takes implementing decisions on the basis of an act adopted under the 
co-decision procedure. Namely the reform established a new type of committee – the 
Regulatory Committees with Scrutiny, where the Parliament has a clear oversight (together with 
the Council).
17 This reform was a significant extension of Parliament’s powers in comitology 
and one of the very few examples (during the 2004-09 term) of where the increase of powers of 
the EP was formalised. 
The only formal acquisition of co-decision powers during the 6
th legislature took place in 2005 
after the Council decided unanimously to shift four legal bases from the third pillar to the co-
                                                      
13 All the examples given would be moved to co-decision under the Lisbon Treaty; therefore enhancing 
the European Parliament’s role in legislative terms. See Corbett et al. (2007), p. 222. 
14 For more information on co-decision, see http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/procedure/index_en.htm and in 
Annex 3.  
15 See i.e. “Blame game starts as Working Time talks collapse”, Euractiv, 28 April 2009. 
16 Definition of the European Parliament (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/fiches/fiche21_en.htm).  
17 On the comitology reform, see for example, Christiansen and Vaccari (2006). 8 | DE CLERCK-SACHSSE & KACZYŃSKI 
 
decision procedure. The four new legal bases subject to co-decision are border controls, asylum 
measures, receiving refugees and handling illegal immigration.
 18 
The political importance of the Parliament in the selection process of the new European 
Commission has been recognised ever since the Santer Commission stepped down in 1999 
ahead of the Parliamentary vote on the motion to censure the Commission. During the 6
th 
Legislature, the Parliament again used its rights and forced the Commission President and the 
Italian Government to change the initial Italian Commissioner after Mr. Buttiglione failed to 
gain the approval of the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee. Moreover, the 
Hungarian Commissioner Mr. Kovacs had to be given a different portfolio after failing to gain 
the Parliament’s support to become Energy Commissioner. An example of the stronger role of 
the Parliament in the legislative process was the adoption of the Services Directive. Here, the 
initial deadlock in the Council gave the Parliament room for manoeuvre in negotiating an 
acceptable compromise and establishing itself more strongly as an equal co-legislator.  
During the 6
th term of the EP there were also attempts by the Parliament to extend its budgetary 
control over other institutions. The Parliament has a long history of claiming more powers 
through budgetary means.
19 During the last term this was no different. For example there is a 
pending issue between the Parliament and the Council General Secretariat on the Council’s 
accounts for 2007. In April 2009 the Parliament postponed approval of the Council’s records 
until further clarifications were provided. In a similar situation in 1999, the Parliament’s 
rejection of the Commission’s accounts led to the collective decommissioning of the entire 
College.
20  
While the budgetary and scrutiny powers of the EP are important;
21 the most important 
development for the EP’s increasing assertiveness has come through the successive extension of 
its legislative capacity.  Ever since the introduction of the co-decision procedure in 1993, there 
has been a gradual increase of co-decision files with each Parliament’s term. Over the past 
fifteen years the number of files with the co-decision method of decision-making grew by 
84%.
22 
Moreover, by the end of the 6
th term for the first time there were more co-decision files put 
forward for the Parliament to address than consultation files (see Figure 3 below). This 
development was an indirect consequence of the shifting focus of the European Commission 
(which has the sole legislative initiative). In the last term the political and legislative activity of 
the Union evolved more and more towards co-decision-oriented topics, such as justice and home 
affairs, the internal market, environment, transport, etc.
23 
                                                      
18 See Presidency Conclusions, European Council (2004), Corbett et al. (2007).  
19 Priestley (2008) 
20 Pop (2009)  
21 European Parliament’s own overview of its powers is available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?language=EN&id=46.  
22 Legislative Observatory of the European Parliament data (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/).  
23 For more on the shifting policy focus of the European Commission, see Sebastian Kurpas, Caroline 
Grøn and Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, The European Commission after Enlargement: Does more add up to 
less?, CEPS Special Report, Brussels 2008 (http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1620).   THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT – MORE POWERFUL, LESS LEGITIMATE? | 9 
 
Table 2. Use of decision-making procedures in the European Parliament 1994-2009 
 Co-Decision  Assent  Consultation  Cooperation 
 Reports  Share  Reports  Share  Reports  Share  Reports  Share 
EP 4 
1994-1999 261  18,4%  71  5,0%  978  68,9% 109  8,3% 
EP 5 
1999-2004 446  35,6%  54  4,3%  752  60,1% 0  0,0% 
EP 6 
2004-2009 479  40,2%  77  6,5%  635  53,3% 1  0,1% 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of EP Legislative Observatory.  
Figure 3. Use of procedures in the European Parliament: Co-decision (COD), Consultation 
(CNS) and Assent (AVC) 
 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of EP Legislative Observatory.  
However the constant increase in parliamentary powers needs to be seen in a wider context. To 
date, the balance of power in the decision-making system of the European Union still remains 
tilted towards the Council of Ministers. Indeed, this disproportion of powers between the two 
European legislators has been the central argument in the debate about the Union’s so called 
‘democratic deficit’. The main argument of the Parliament in claiming more and more powers 
has always been that this institution provides for the Union’s democratic legitimacy, being the 
only EU institution that is directly elected. Strengthening the powers of the EP, so the argument 
goes, strengthens the EU’s democratic legitimacy.  
2.2  Trends for the 7
th legislature 
If the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force during the 7
th term of the European Parliament, it would 
constitute a major change in the balance between consultation and co-decision - regardless of 
the political and legislative activity of the European Commission. The Treaty expands the 
application of co-decision to areas such as agriculture and fisheries (with exclusions), 
intellectual property, energy, structural funds, immigration policy and others. It also grants the 
Parliament additional powers in areas where the EU did not have competences such as tourism, 
sport or the new instrument of a citizens’ initiative. It creates a new list of issues, to which the 
co-decision procedure may be further extended. This applies for example to elements of social 
policy, environmental protection or family law. Clearly, the Parliament’s powers would be 
extended significantly as a result. Nevertheless the Parliament’s legislative powers are still 
lesser than those of the Council, in areas where the consultation procedure applies and in those 
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few policies on which the Parliament is not consulted (i.e. issues related to the customs union 
and some aspects of economic policy).  
Should the Treaty of Lisbon not enter into force, the further extension of the EP’s powers will 
be halted. However, two developments could still help the chamber to flex its muscles. First, the 
new EP’s scrutiny powers under the comitology procedure only began to be operational in 2008; 
therefore during the new term the Parliament will have more opportunities to exercise its newly 
acquired rights. Secondly, under the current treaties there are still possibilities to extend the 
application of co-decision to new areas, namely to legal immigration, rights of legal residents 
and certain social provisions. Additionally we might expect further attempts to extend 
Parliament’s powers using the budgetary means (also in common foreign and security policy) or 
by revising its own rules of procedures. 
Most certainly the 7
th European Parliament will also try to influence the nominations for the 
new European Commission by invoking the powers that it would receive under the Treaty of 
Lisbon. A first attempt was already made with the parliamentary report on the impact of the 
Treaty of Lisbon on the development of the institutional balance of the European Union, where 
the Parliament called on the European Council to apply the provisions of the new treaty 
informally in 2009.
24 It is likely that in 2009 there will be yet another power struggle between 
the Parliament, the Commission President and the Council on the composition of the College of 
Commissioners. The 1999 and 2004 cases have proven the Parliament to be very successful at 
this game; a similar situation could be expected for 2009. Indeed, there are already signals from 
the Parliament that should Commissioner McCreevy seek reappointment, he might face 
difficulties in the chamber. 
3. More  powerful, less legitimate? 
3.1  Streamlining the legislative procedure: efficiency, but at what price? 
Apart from a gradual shift towards co-decision as the most common form of adopting new 
legislation, one of the most noticeable trends in EP decision-making in the last legislature was a 
huge increase in first reading agreements. Given that the process of several readings in the co-
decision procedure is time-consuming and complex, there has been an increasing tendency to 
pass a legislative act after only one reading in the Parliament. The obvious advantage of fast-
tracking the legislative procedure via first reading agreements is that this allows for proposals 
that are uncontroversial or where swift action is needed for a proposal to be passed without 
delay. A first reading agreement for example was crucial for a quick adoption of the energy and 
climate change package at the end of 2008, signalling the EU’s capacity to act swiftly on 
important policy questions.  
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Figure 4. Agreements in co-decision according from the 5
th to the 6
th legislature of the 
European Parliament 
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Source: Working Party on Parliamentary Reform, Second Interim Report on Legislative Activities and 
Interinstitutional Relations, May 2008. 
There are also a number of concerns raised by this process, however. The ability to agree upon a 
text after just one parliamentary reading means that much informal negotiation between the 
responsible committee and the Council is necessary. This means that only a limited number of 
actors (usually the rapporteur, one or two shadow rapporteurs and possibly the committee chair) 
are involved in the negotiations. Moreover, the bulk of the political debate takes place behind 
the closed doors of negotiating chambers rather than publicly. This informality necessarily 
limits the transparency of the procedure and leaves little room for political debate. The rise of 
first reading agreements also strengthens the role of the parliamentary committees as opposed to 
plenary in the legislative process. There are two reasons why this might be problematic. First, 
the composition of committees is not always representative of the entire chamber. Second, if 
plenary adopts a compromise that is pre-negotiated by the responsible committee there is little 
chance of a politicised and controversial debate. The latter, however, is crucial to capturing 
public attention. 
Indeed, the sharp increase of first reading agreements (together with ‘early second reading 
agreements), has been a matter of concern for the EP’s internal reform. Given that, taken 
together, early agreements now constitute around 80% of the files decided under co-decision, an 
internal working group has taken up the issue proposing to limit the use of first reading 
agreements to cases where they are clearly advantageous, such as in uncontroversial cases, 
highly technical matters, or matters of urgency. Moreover, the document also suggests ensuring 
that exploratory talks with the other EU institutions in so-called ‘trialogues’ do not go at the cost 
of transparency and plurality, by setting a clear mandate for negotiators by the committee and 
ensuring regular feedback by the rapporteurs to the committee.
25   
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Apart from concerns about the transparency and legitimacy of the process there is also 
controversy over whether agreement early in the legislative process favours the position of the 
Council or the European Parliament. While some take the view that first reading agreements 
show an increasing willingness of the Council to take on Parliament’s amendments, others argue 
that an agreement early on means the EP is merely rubber-stamping the Council’s position. To 
be sure, the balance of interests is likely to differ from one legislative proposal to another. 
However, since early agreements necessitate compromise rather than controversial debate, they 
certainly replicate the working logic of the Council rather than that of the Parliament. In many 
ways the increasing use of first reading agreements exemplifies a trade-off between the 
efficiency of the EP as a legislator and its ability to serve as a forum for the emergence of 
different political positions. Institutional reform measures that reconsider the increased use of 
first reading agreements, as well as the issue of representativeness in committees are therefore 
to be welcomed.  
3.2  Growing powers versus falling turnout: more powers do not equal 
more interest 
One of the paradoxes facing the European Parliament is that its growing powers and 
assertiveness vis-à-vis the other EU institutions have not translated into growing public interest. 
The European Parliament is still the most widely trusted of the European institutions (51% of 
EU citizens trust the EP compared to 48% who trust the European Central Bank and 47% who 
trust the European Commission),
26 however, the rise in the EPs powers to act as a co-legislator 
of the Council has been mirrored by a decrease rather than an increase in voter interest (see 
Figure 5 below).    
Figure 5. Turnout to EP elections and Share of Co-Decision Files  
 
Source: European Parliament elections turnout: EP 2004 elections website 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2004/ep-election/sites/en/index.html; Co-Decision Files: 
own calculations based on European Parliament Legislative Observatory.  
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Some of the problems encountered by the EP in stimulating public interest are of a structural 
nature. European policy on the whole is rather difficult to politicise. The multilingual nature of 
the European Parliament, for example, reduces the capacity for a quick exchange of pertinent 
viewpoints, making debates in the Parliament less exciting and more difficult to follow.
27 
Moreover, the fact that there is no clear divide between governing and opposition parties means 
that coalitions shift from policy issue to policy issue. While this allows political groups much 
more flexibility in deciding the position on a case-by-case basis it also makes it hard for outside 
observers to establish any clear patterns or positions. The fact that individual policy questions 
are increasingly decided along a left-right spectrum has not led to the perception of the EP as an 
increasingly politicised actor overall. There is still a tendency to perceive the Parliament as a 
unitary actor and the lack of a fully developed culture of debate certainly emphasises this.  
While there have been some attempts to remedy this tendency in the 2009 election campaign, by 
emphasising the ideological differences between parties, for example on economic and social 
policy in the party manifestos, this has only been partially successful. On the whole voters still 
struggle to distinguish different party programmes. In any case European elections are 
dominated by national issues rather than European policy.  
The abovementioned focus on work in the parliamentary committees reduces the ability to 
capture public attention. While the EP’s committees (unlike those of many national parliaments) 
are open to the public they are guided by a different logic, where technical policy detail rather 
than clear-cut and easily transmissible ideological positions dominate. Lastly, the fact that the 
European Parliament elections are not linked to the appointment of a government also plays a 
role in making European elections less salient than national ones. 
The absence of a politicised European debate, however, is clearly detrimental to the EP’s 
capacity to present itself as a relevant political actor. The increasing focus on streamlining 
procedures in the European Parliament and the focus on technical detail outlined above only 
emphasise these problems. This means that extending the powers of the Parliament and 
presenting itself ever more as an efficient legislative body has not ‘paid off’ in terms of how it is 
perceived as a political actor outside Brussels, most importantly by the public. This poses a 
considerable problem for the legitimacy of the Parliament. If growing powers are matched with 
continually falling turnout, the logic of strengthening the European Parliament’s powers as a 
means of democratising EU governance is undermined. In order to halt this trend, the next 
European Parliament should therefore carefully balance the need for efficiency with its role as a 
public forum for political debate. Therefore, more efforts should be made to politicise the debate 
in the EP, and debate in plenary should be structured around the most politically salient 
questions. Indeed, the experience of the Services Directive has shown that, while difficult, it is 
possible for the Parliament to shape controversial policy.  
Moreover, in addition to making EU policy more relevant to the public, the EP elections should 
be personalised, presenting ‘faces’ that the public can recognise and relate to. In this regard the 
role of national parties is also crucial in presenting candidates to the EP that are able to make an 
impact and in giving some space to European themes in the European election campaign.   
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Conclusion 
The fears that enlargement would cause a major hiccup in the workings of the European 
Parliament have proved unfounded. On the contrary, it has been shown that the EP actually 
managed to maintain its performance during the last legislature. However, enlargement has had 
a more indirect effect on accelerating the development towards more streamlined procedures 
and towards an emphasis on efficient decision-making. While enlargement cannot be seen as the 
sole cause of this trend, it can perhaps be seen as bolstering an already existing development.  
The balance between the efficiency of its work and the need for transparency and public debate 
is a difficult one to strike for any legislature, not just the European Parliament. Moreover, the 
dismal figures for predicted voter turnout must be seen in the context of growing public 
disillusionment, also in the member states. An ever more powerful European Parliament would 
ignore the problem of growing public apathy at its peril. In order to assess the future 
development of the EP, both its political power positioning in the EU institutional context and 
its wider legitimacy need to be taken into account. An assessment of the 6
th legislature shows 
that the EP has gained within the institutional triangle of EU institutions. If the Treaty of Lisbon 
is ratified during the term of the EP’s 7
th legislature, this trend will be considerably reinforced. 
If it fails to capture the public’s interest at the same time, however, its institutional raison d’être 
as the democratic pillar of the European Union will be in jeopardy. 
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Annex 1. European Parliament: 5
th & 6
th Legislature 
Composition of the European Parliament in the 6
th legislature: 
 
                Total 
EU15 
  6   7   6       2           3   24 
  1   5   4   1   1   1   1       14  
  49   23   7       13   7           99  
  11   8               4   1       24  
  5   1   1   4       1   1       13  
  18   31   10       6   3   3   7   78  
  24   24  2       3   1           54  
  6   5   3       1   2   2       19  
  24   17   12   13   2   7       3   78  
  7   7   5       4   2   2       27  
  4   3   5       1   1           14  
  27   19   11       5   1   8   7   78  
  9   12               3           24  
  3   1   1       1               6  
  6   7   1       2           2   18  
Total EU15  200  170  68  18  41  33  18  22  570 
%  69.4%  78.3%  68.0%  40.9%  95.3%  80.5%  81.8%  73.3%  72.6% 
EU12 
  5   5   5                   3   18 
  14   2               6   1   1   24  
  1   3   2                       6  
  3       1           2           6  
  3       1   4   1               9  
  2   2   7   2                   13  
  13   9   2                       24  
  2   3                           5  
  15   9   6   20           3   1   54  
  18   10   6       1               35  
  4   1   2                       7  
  8   3                       3   14  
Total EU12  88  47  32  26  2  8  4  8  215 
%   30.6%  21.7%  32.0%  59.1%  4.7%  19.5%  18.2%  26.7%  27.4% 
 
                Total 
Total  288   217   100   44   43   41   22   30   785 
Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/expert/groupAndCountry.do?language=EN 18 | DE CLERCK-SACHSSE & KACZYŃSKI 
 
European Political Groups in the EP 
from 1999-2009
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Ratio of European Political Party Groups in the 5th and 6th legislature: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seats taken in the European Parliament for the 5
th and 6
th legislature: 
  1999 2004 2009 
  EPP-ED  233 37.2% 268 36.6% 288 36.7% 
  PES  180 28.8% 200 27.3% 217 27.6% 
  ELDR - ALDE  51  8.1%  88  12.0%  100  12.7% 
  Greens/EFA  48 7.7% 42 5.7% 43 5.5% 
  GUE/NGL  42 6.7% 41 5.6% 41 5.2% 
  UEN  30 4.8% 27 3.7% 44 5.6% 
  TDI  -  IND/DEM 18 2.9% 37 5.1% 22 2.8% 
  EDD  16  2.6%  - - - - 
  NI  8  1.3% 29 4.0% 30 3.8% 
  Total  626 100% 732 100% 785 100% 
Sources: Own sources based on information from the European Parliament 
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Annex 2. Methodology and Sources 
The paper draws upon a mix of quantitative and qualitative elements.  
I.  Quantitative Methods 
The following sources were used for the quantitative research: 
•  OEIL: Output of procedures by the European Parliament 
Figures on legislative and non-legislative output were retrieved from the Legislative 
Observatory of the European Parliament and analysed by looking at policy areas, national 
delegations and European party participation. For comparable data we used output from the 
1994-1999, 1999-2004 legislature and 2004-2009 legislatures. The comparison has allowed the 
identification of changes in relation to a number of indicators, both concerning the quantity and 
type of output. Results indicate the degree of change and the functioning of the European 
Parliament since 2004. 
•  European Parliament directory: Mapping of positions of European deputies 
The positions of the Members of the European Parliament were mapped. This allowed an 
assessment of the output in terms of the allocated positions in the European political party 
groups, parliamentary committees and delegations (committee/delegation bureau members, 
group coordinators, rapporteurs) and the European Parliament bodies (Bureau, Conference of 
Presidents).  
•  Other sources: voting behaviour and cohesion, coalition building 
Gathering data on voting behaviour and cohesion are subject to limitations of availability. Most 
data is available from http://www.votewatch.eu/, which is used in this study as a main source on 
voting behaviour, cohesion and coalition building. 
II.  Qualitative Methods 
The findings obtained from the data were complemented by qualitative research. Researchers 
conducted 34 in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Besides European Parliament deputies and 
officials, the Council and Commission officials were interviewed, as well as other experts and 
long-time observers (EU-correspondents and think-tank academics). Interviewees were selected 
either on the basis of their horizontal functions (coordination, interinstitutional relations, senior 
advisers) or because they worked in particularly dynamic policy areas that either showed 
considerable changes in output or had high-profile proposals under discussion. Interviewees 
were shown the retrieved quantitative research and their responses helped to put the data into a 
broader context. The interviewees, who wished to remain anonymous, provided important 
insights into the developments that have occurred in the European Parliament since 2004. 
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Source: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/stepbystep/diagram_en.htm. For a more detailed version see 
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